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!e main focus of the contemporary debate on mental causation has cen-
tred on whether mental events can cause other events in virtue of their 
mental properties, or only in virtue of their physical ones. Whilst reduc-
tive physicalists maintain that the only properties that exist are physical 
properties, and that any mental or other “higher-level” properties are only 
properties in virtue of their being identical with some physical property, 
non-reductive physicalists maintain that mental or other “higher-level” 
properties are irreducible to physical ones. A common charge that has 
been levelled against non-reductive physicalists is that if mental proper-
ties are irreducible then they must be causally inert or “epiphenomenal” 
since it cannot be the case that both mental and physical properties are 
simultaneously causal, a position which the literature has come to call 
property epiphenomenalism. !is paper argues that the charge of property 
epiphenomenalism is misplaced when it is applied to Donald Davidson’s 
anomalous monism. Davidson cannot be accused of property epiphenom-
enalism because properties do not feature in his ontology and, therefore, 
play no role in his account of causal relations between events. Davidson’s 
work and name have become embroiled in the debate about property epi-
phenomenalism because he is mistakenly thought to be working in an 
old tradition that accepts properties as an ontological category and that 
maintains that it is only in virtue of their properties that events have the 
e"ects that they do. Whilst the conceptual irreducibility of mental types 
to physical types (predicate dualism), which is the hallmark of non-reduc-
tive physicalism, is, for non-reductive physicalists, a consequence of an 
ontological non-reductivism (property dualism), for Davidson the start 
and end point is the denial of conceptual reduction (i.e. the acceptance of 
predicate dualism only). !us Davidson is neither a non-reductive physi-
calist, nor can he be accused of property epiphenomenalism – properties 
simply do not enter into his philosophical scheme.
 !is paper is divided into eight sections. !e #rst section introduces 
the mental causation debate by giving a brief outline of its history up to 
the contemporary debate about property epiphenomenalism. !e second 
section outlines the argument for anomalous monism. !e third sec-
tion outlines one of the earliest arguments that asserted that anomalous 
monism implies property epiphenomenalism. !e fourth section out-
lines various non-reductive physicalist responses that attempt to defend 
non-reductivism. !e #fth section outlines Kim’s in$uential “overdeter-
mination” argument – the claim that non-reductive physicalists must 
accept either property epiphenomenalism or overdetermination. !e sixth 
section makes the case that anomalous monism cannot imply property 
epiphenomenalism. !e seventh section deals with Sophie Gibb’s (2006) 
criticisms of Davidson’s underlying approach to ontology, as instances of 
more appropriate criticisms. !e #nal section concludes. 
2. !e Mental Causation Debate
Cartesian dualism is the classic form of substance dualism. Descartes main-
tained that there are two kinds of substance, material and mental, and 
that man is a union of a spatially extended, material substance (the body), 
which is incapable of thought or feeling, and a spatially un-extended, men-
tal substance (the mind or soul), which thinks and feels.
 Now, pre-theoretic conceptions of agency hold that the mind and the 
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body causally interact. When, for example, Alfred summons the waiter 
(by raising his hand, say), we say that his wanting to order caused him 
to do so, just as we say that my intention to read Emile Zola’s Germinal 
causes my buying of the text. And, in agreement with these common sense 
intuitions, Descartes also maintained that the mind and the body causally 
interact. However, one of the main problems for Cartesian dualism is how 
to marry the possibility of mental-physical causal interaction with the total 
independence of mental and material substances – it is very di%cult to see 
how an un-extended, immaterial substance with no presence in physical 
space could causally in$uence material bodies that are subject to the laws 
of physics. And indeed, as Kim notes, the ‘inability to explain the possibil-
ity of “mental causation”, how mentality can make a causal di"erence to 
the world, doomed Cartesian dualism’ (Kim, 1996: 4).
 !e majority position (see Kim, 1996; Crane 2003) in contempo-
rary philosophy of mind rejects Cartesian dualism in favour of a kind 
of monism, which argues that there is only one kind of substance. More 
speci#cally, it is a physicalist or “materialist” monism that has come to 
dominate the debate, a position that is generally known as physicalism. 
Kim de#nes ontological physicalism as the position that ‘there are no con-
crete existents, or substances, in the spacetime world other than material 
particles and their aggregates’ (Kim, 1996: 211) and observes that ‘in most 
contemporary debates, ontological physicalism forms the starting point of 
discussion rather than a conclusion that needs to be established.’ (Ibid.: 
211) 
 However, embracing physicalism does not resolve the problem of 
mental causation that dogged substance dualism: it still remains unclear 
as to how mental events or objects (whatever their apparent relation to 
the physical substance that constitutes them) can causally interact with 
physical events or objects. !e debate has simply shifted its focus from 
substances to properties, as Kim notes ‘the most intensely debated issue – 
in fact, the only substantive remaining issue – concerning the mind-body 
relation has centred on properties – that is, the question how mental and 
physical properties are related to each other’ (Ibid.: 211-212 – emphasis in 
original). To make sense of the debate to which Kim refers it will be help-
ful to draw on the distinction between token identity and type identity. 
Token identity states that any mental event or object is identical with some 
physical event or object – accepting token identity implies a rejection of 
substance dualism. Type identity, in contrast, holds that mental event 
types are identical with/reducible to physical event types – “types” here are 
generally taken to mean properties, although, as we will later observe, it 
can also mean predicates.
 Accepting both token identity and type identity is a reductive physical-
ist position. Reductive physicalists deny mental causation because, as they 
maintain, a mental event only has the causal power it does in virtue  of its 
being identical with some physical event; that it is only because the event is 
of a certain physical type that it is the cause it is, and its being of a certain 
mental type is just a consequence of its being that physical type.
 In contrast to the reductive physicalist position, Donald Davidson’s 
anomalous monism (1970, 1993) seeks to defend the possibility of men-
tal causation. !e idea that reasons are causes of actions is a central part 
of Davidson’s philosophy (see Davidson, 1963) and anomalous monism 
represents a stance in the philosophy of mind that combines his position 
on mental causation with other elements of his philosophy, including his 
views on events (see Davidson, 1969), causation (see Davidson, 1967b) 
and semantics (see Davidson, 1967a, 1974a, 1977). Whilst anomalous 
monism accepts token identity, it denies type identity (where by “types” 
Davidson would have in mind predicates rather than properties), holding 
that mental types are irreducible to physical ones.
 In response, many critics (e.g., Honderich, 1982;  McLaughlin, 1993; 
Kim 1993a) have argued that anomalous monism is inherently contradic-
tory and that the only reasonable way to resolve the contradiction is to 
accept that mental events are epiphenomenal, or rather that mental prop-
erties are epiphenomenal – the general argument taking the form that it 
is only in virtue of an event’s being a certain physical type that it has the 
e"ect that it does, and not in virtue of its being a certain mental type, that 
mental events do not cause anything qua mental; a position which we 
shall call property epiphenomenalism. In response to these criticisms, argu-
ments in defence of anomalous monism (e.g., LePore & Loewer (1987), 
Macdonald & Macdonald (1991), Macdonald (2007)), which are usually 
dubbed non-reductive physicalism, have been proposed. !ese arguments, 
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in general, contort the positions developed by Davidson’s critics in such a 
way as to (attempt to) restore causal e%cacy and relevance to the mental 
properties of events.
 In so far as the debate is one between reductive and non-reductive 
physicalists, or one between non-reductive physicalists of di"erent stripes, 
asking whether or not their positions imply property epiphenomenalism 
is a reasonable line of inquiry. Where it ceases to become reasonable is 
when Davidson’s anomalous monism is made the object of this line of 
attack either explicitly or because it has been classed, as it frequently is 
(e.g. Jacob, 2002), as a form of non-reductive physicalism. As Davidson 
(1967b, 1980, 1993) maintains, and as is reiterated by Tim Crane (1995) 
and Sophie Gibb (2006), causal relations are extensional relations between 
events; they are independent of the manner of their description. To ask, 
within the framework of anomalous monism, whether a mental event 
causes a physical event in virtue of its mental properties or only in virtue of 
its physical properties is to misinterpret a fundamental tenet of the theory 
of anomalous monism. Properties do not feature in the ontological sys-
tem on which anomalous monism is based, owing to Davidson’s holistic, 
truth-conditional approach to semantics and metaphysics, and, as such, it 
simply cannot be criticised for rendering properties epiphenomenal. Prop-
erties are simply irrelevant to anomalous monism. !e following sections 
make that case. 
3. Anomalous Monism
Davidson (1970) originally presented anomalous monism as a solution to 
an apparent paradox between three principles which he was inclined to 
accept:
1. !e Principle of Causal Interaction (CI): ‘!at at least some mental 
events interact causally with physical events’ (Davidson, 1980: 208)
2. !e Nomological Character of Causality (NCC): All causal rela-
tions instantiate a strict law
3. !e Anomalism of the Mental (AOM): !ere are no strict psych-
physical laws
In terms of the discussion of previous section, CI is just the acceptance of 
the possibility of what we have been calling mental causation. NCC is, by 
Davidson’s own acknowledgment (Davidson, 1970: 209), unsupported. 
AOM is defended by appealing to Quine’s argument of the indeterminacy 
of translation: it is not possible to formulate strict laws that relate the 
two, distinct, conceptual realms, because mental concepts are not explica-
ble in physical vocabulary, nor physical concepts in mental vocabulary. As 
Davidson notes:
‘!ere are no strict psychophysical laws because of the disparate 
commitments of the mental and physical schemes’ (Davidson, 1970: 
222). 
It is from this principle that Davidson’s denial of type identity arises; because 
there is no systematic correlation between mental and physical types there 
is no basis for reduction from the mental to the physical.
 So, in anomalous monism (1) the mental interacts causally with the 
physical, (2) any given causal interaction is describable by a strict law, and 
(3) there are no psychophysical strict laws. Since Davidson holds that the 
physical is causally closed1, i.e., that “any physical e"ect must have a suf-
#cient physical cause” (Crane, 1995: 7), he maintains that the strict law 
instantiated by any causal relation is always a strict physical law. !erefore, 
any causal relation between two events is describable by a strict physical 
law, including the interaction between a mental event and a physical event. 
Davidson solves the apparent paradox by concluding that mental events 
just are physical events; he endorses token identity. However, an event is 
mental only insofar as it is given a mental description, and is physical only 
insofar as it is given a physical description – the two are both descriptions 
of the same event in di"erent vocabularies. Hence, unlike physicalists, 
Davidson gives no ontological primacy to physical descriptions but, to put 
it loosely, regards them only as a kind of description that – in virtue of the 
formation of our physical concepts – happens to allow for the statement 
of strict laws. As a result, Davidson’s position constitutes a kind of neutral 
monism, not, strictly speaking, a kind of physicalism.
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4. Causation, In Virtue Of
Ted Honderich (1982) was one of the #rst to critique anomalous monism 
for rendering mental properties epiphenomenal. Honderich argues that 
only those properties of an event that can enter into lawlike connections 
could be causally relevant and since, in anomalous monism, the mental 
properties of an event cannot enter into lawlike connections, he argues 
that it renders mental properties epiphenomenal; that anomalous mon-
ism entails property epiphenomenalism, or, as it is otherwise called (e.g. 
McLaughlin, 1993), type epiphenomenalism.
 Honderich’s argument begins by noting Davidson’s ontological con-
ception of an event as an “irreducible entity” and adds to this position the 
claim that ‘an event has an inde#nite number of properties, features or 
aspects’ (Honderich, 1982: 60). To illustrate this point, consider a brick: it 
could be said to have, amongst others, the properties of “hardness”, “red-
ness”, “coarseness” and “being cuboid”. Given that events have properties 
in this same way, Honderich argues that ‘it is in virtue of certain of its 
properties rather than others that an event is the cause it is’ (Ibid.: 61). So, 
in the event of the brick breaking a window, it is the brick’s property of 
hardness coupled with the window’s property of fragility and a small set of 
other properties (e.g. the brick’s velocity) that break the window. !e two 
properties are thus relevant to the cause and e"ect relation, whilst proper-
ties such as the “redness” or “coarseness” of the brick are irrelevant to it. So, 
Honderich concludes:
‘If the ground for saying that two events are in lawlike connection is that 
they are cause and e"ect,[2] and it is the case that all of their properties 
save some residue are irrelevant to their being cause and e"ect, then they 
are in the given lawlike connection solely in virtue of that residue of 
properties’ (Ibid.: 62).
Honderich thus claims that causal relations exist only between certain 
properties of events, and that a lawlike connection exists in virtue of these 
properties. He calls this claim the “Principle of the Nomological Character 
of Causally Relevant Properties”.
 
 Now, since AOM implies that mental properties cannot enter into 
strict lawlike connections with physical properties, Honderich contends 
that they are not captured by this Principle, i.e., mental properties are not 
causally relevant. !erefore, either we must reject AOM or reject the claim 
that mental events interact with physical invents (CI). Honderich suggests 
that we should reject the strong form of CI, and argues, instead, that it is 
mental events as physical events that cause physical events. So, whilst men-
tal events do interact with physical events, it is only in virtue of their being 
identical with physical events.  !erefore, since the mental properties of 
mental events are epiphenomenal in the causal relation, Davidson must be 
a property epiphenomenalist. 
 !is accusation of property epiphenomenalism is common amongst 
most of Davidson’s critics. Indeed, Kim observes that it has been voiced 
with “an impressive if unsurprising unanimity” (Kim, 1993a: 20). More-
over, property epiphenomenalism proves to be one of the dividing issues 
between reductive physicalists, who accept it, and non-reductive physical-
ists, who generally seek to reject it. !e non-reductive physicalist attempts 
to reject type-epiphenomenalism, and the arguments against them, are the 
focus of the next two sections.
5.!e Non-Reductive Physicalist Defence
!e general form of the non-reductive physicalist responses to the charge 
of type epiphenomenalism (e.g., Macdonald & Macdonald, 1991) is to 
maintain that we should be careful to distinguish between universals (which 
they call properties) and particulars (which they call property-instances). A 
property, e.g. “hardness”, is distinct from any given property-instance that 
instantiates it, e.g. this brick’s “being hard”, and it is the latter, and not 
the former, that are causally e%cacious (it is the brick’s “being hard” that 
breaks the window, not “hardness” in general).
 So, whilst mental properties are irreducible to physical ones, particular 
mental property-instances (that is, mental events which instantiate cer-
tain mental properties) may be either realised by (e.g., LePore & Loewer, 
1987), or identical3 to (e.g., Macdonald & Macdonald, 1991), a physi-
cal property-instance (that is, the physical event which instantiates certain 
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universal physical properties).4 !erefore, whilst mental properties are not 
causally e%cacious, instantiated mental properties are causally e%cacious 
because they are identical to, or realized by, the physical event (which 
instantiates “its” physical properties).
‘To say that a mental property of a physical event is causally relevant (that 
is, that a mental event is causally e%cacious qua mental) is to say at least 
that an exempli#cation of that property, that is, that event, is causally 
e%cacious in bringing about an e"ect of that event. !is will require 
that (mental) instance to be a physical instance, that is, will require one 
and the same event to be an instance of both a mental and a physical 
property’ (Macdonald & Macdonald, 1991: 562). 
!is argument bears an apparent similarity to anomalous monism in so 
far as it advances a token identity theory. For Davidson, it is not possi-
ble to separate mental causation from physical causation precisely because 
causal relations are between events, and the mental event is identical with 
the physical event, thus mental causation just is physical causation. Simi-
larly, with the property-instance version of non-reductive physicalism, one 
cannot ask whether a mental event causes a physical event in virtue of 
its instantiating particular mental properties, or in virtue of its instantia-
ting particular physical properties, since the mental property-instance is 
identical with the physical-property instance, thus mental causation just is 
physical causation.
6. Kim’s Overdetermination Critique of Non-Reductive 
Physicalism
Jaegwon Kim has probably been the most proli#c critic of non-reductive 
physicalism. He charges that non-reductive physicalism, including the 
property-instance variety outlined above, if it wishes to accept physical 
causal closure, must either accept type epiphenomenalism or imply causal 
overdetermination5 (Kim 1993b, Kim 2005). His argument is as follows:
 Suppose that M, a mental event or property-instance, causes another 
mental event (property-instance), M*.  Now, supervenience variously 
(dependent on its interpretation) implies that both M and M* are identi-
cal to or realised by physical events (property-instances), let us call these, 
respectively, P and P* and since M causes M*, P must also cause P*. But, if 
P causes P*, and M and M* are each, respectively, realised by their physi-
cal events, then M* would have been realised irrespective of whether or 
not it was caused by M, since the instantiation of P* would have realised 
it. So, says Kim, perhaps the causal e%cacy of M comes from its having 
caused P*. However, if M causes P* then P* is overdetermined; having 
been caused both by M and by P. !erefore, concludes Kim, either we 
must accept that mental events cause physical events in virtue of their 
physical properties (property epiphenomenalism) or we must claim that 
mental causation always involves the overdetermination of its e"ects.
 Kim originally formulated this argument as one against realization the-
ses such as LePore and Loewer (1987), and, as Macdonald (2007) notes, 
it does not apply with the same force to the property-instance identity 
theses.6 However,  where the property-instance identity version fails, Kim 
would perhaps claim, is in its violation of the explanatory exclusion prin-
ciple (e.g. Kim, 1989a). !e explanatory exclusion principle e"ectively 
denies overdetermination in explanation, that is, that there cannot be two 
independent causal explanations of one event. !e property-instance iden-
tity thesis fails this criterion because it o"ers both a mental and physical 
causal explanation of the same event; thus, Kim might claim, the mental 
properties cannot be causally relevant (given causal closure of the physi-
cal).
 Kim summarises the “Mental Causation Problem” for non-reductive 
physicalists as follows:
‘Causal e%cacy of mental properties is inconsistent with the joint 
acceptance of the following four claims: (i) physical causal closure, (ii) 
causal exclusion, (iii) mind-body supervenience, and (iv) mental/physical 
property dualism—the view that mental properties are irreducible to 
physical properties’ (Kim, 2005: 21-22).
To elaborate brie$y on each of these:
i. Physical Causal Closure – Any physical e"ect must have a su%cient 
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physical cause.
ii. Causal Exclusion – “If an event e has a su%cient cause c at t, no 
event at t distinct from c can be a cause of e (unless this is a genuine 
case of causal overdetermination7)” (Kim, 2005: 17).8
iii. Mind-Body Supervenience9 – !ere can be no change in a men-
tal event or property-instance without a change in the corresponding 
physical event or property-instance.
iv. Mental/Physical Property Dualism – Mental properties are irreduci-
ble to physical properties (i.e. the distinguishing tenet of non-reductive 
physicalism).
Kim’s position is to reject (iv), maintaining that mental properties are 
reducible to physical ones, and that mental properties have causal e%-
cacy only because they are so reducible, i.e., mental events are causally 
e%cacious in virtue of their physical properties, hence property epiphe-
nomenalism.
7. Anomalous Monism Cannot Imply Property Epiphe-
nomenalism
In his response to Davidson’s “!inking Causes,” (in which Davidson 
defends anomalous monism against its critics), Kim (1993a) argues that 
simply dispatching with the “inelegant locutions” of “qua” and “in virtue 
of”10 will not get rid of the main issue which, for Kim, ‘has always been the 
causal e!cacy of properties of events – no matter how they, the events or the 
properties, are described,’ (Kim, 1993a: 21 – emphasis in original). !is is 
exactly the same position as is developed by Honderich when he attributes 
properties to events, and states that the issue of causation is the relation 
between properties of events. And this is precisely where these critics of 
anomalous monism, and those who come to its defence with property-
based arguments, are wrong. Talk of properties of mental or physical events 
is just irrelevant to anomalous monism. As Sophie Gibb (2006: 408) so 
clearly notes, the basic causal relata of Davidson’s ontological system are 
events; properties simply do not feature in it.
7.1 Anomalous Monism, Properties and Predicates
!e key to understanding Davidson’s position is acknowledging that 
‘unlike his critics, Davidson does not consider events to have properties, 
because for him properties are not objective aspects of things in the world’ 
(Gibb, 2006: 414). Davidson endorses a kind of nominalism and rejects a 
correspondence theory of truth; for him predicates do not pick out objec-
tive features of the world that we might call “properties”, they do not refer 
to anything: ‘Nothing [...] no thing, makes sentences and theories true: not 
experience, not surface irritations, not the world can make a sentence true’ 
(Davidson, 1974b: 194). Arguably the most important point in under-
standing the theory of anomalous monism is this denial of the referential 
character of predicates. So, for Davidson, the statement “this brick is hard” 
is not true in any sense that involves correspondence with the world. 
 Indeed, this seems to clearly follow from his argument in support of 
the Anomalism of the Mental. As noted above, Davidson refers to the 
‘disparate commitments of the mental and physical schemes’ which pre-
clude the possibility of strict psychophysical laws. Now, it is only possible 
to maintain that both mental and physical descriptions of events can be 
“true” descriptions of events (as Davidson does) if the criteria of veri#ca-
tion, or the truth-conditions for the applications of particular mental or 
physical descriptions, are not inherent in the event itself. For Davidson, 
properties of events are things we ascribe to them from the perspective of a 
given theoretical backdrop and vocabulary, ‘talk about properties is simply 
talk about the predicates that can be ascribed to an event when the event 
is variously described’ (Gibb, 2006: 414). We say that the brick is hard in 
relation to its breaking the window only because our physical theory and 
vocabulary relate those terms in such and such a way, not because, in some 
objective reality, the brick is hard, or because it instantiates the property 
of “hardness”. !us, for Davidson, an event could not cause an e"ect in 
virtue of its having certain properties, since an event need not have (onto-
logically) any properties. 
 As such, Davidson’s denial of type identity is a position of predicate 
dualism – Davidson denies the possibility of conceptual reduction of men-
tal descriptions to physical ones. Ontologically, however, Davidson is an 
out-and-out monist: there are only events. In contrast, the non-reductive 
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physicalist maintains, according to Kim (see section 5), a sort of property 
dualism: for non-reductive physicalists mental properties are not ontologi-
cally reducible to physical ones (although they are somehow dependent 
on, or realised by, them). Non-reductive physicalists will thus probably 
be predicate dualists as well, since they take predicates to refer to these 
properties, but the non-reductivism arises at the ontological, rather than 
the conceptual level, whilst Davidson argues precisely the opposite; his is a 
purely conceptual non-reductivism.
7.2 Davidsonian Causal Relations
Davidson’s theory of causation maintains that ‘causes are individual events, 
and causal relations hold between events’ (Davidson, 1967b: 161). He 
accepts what he calls the ‘principle of extensional substitution’ (Ibid.: 153) 
which states simply that causal relations are extensional so that we cannot 
change the truth-value of a sentence by substituting co-referring terms. 
In the expression “Alfred’s wanting to order caused him to raise his arm”, 
Alfred’s wanting to order is a (mental) description of the event that caused 
the event of Alfred’s arm’s rising, but another description might be “Alfred’s 
brain state caused him to raise his arm”. !e latter substitutes a physical 
description of the #rst event for a mental one, but, according to Davidson’s 
principle of extensional substitution, since the referent of both expressions 
is the same event, the truth of the sentence remains unchanged. And this 
is really the point of Davidson’s system: causal relations are between events, 
independent of their description. Since there is nothing in Davidson’s 
ontology for predicates to correspond to, the causal relation cannot be 
said to be in virtue of the event being describable in one way rather than 
another. As Davidson notes:
‘Given [my] extensionalist view of causal relations it makes no literal 
sense [...] to speak of an event causing something as mental, or by virtue 
of its mental properties’ (Davidson, 1993: 13).
7.3 Anomalous Monism Cannot Imply Property Epiphenomenalism
To re-cap, Davidson’s ontology does not include properties; his non-reduc-
tivism is conceptual rather than ontological. Causal relations are between 
events and are independent of the manner in which the causal relation is 
described (or, in strictly non-Davidsonian phraseology, of the properties 
that the event has). As such Davidson necessarily denies a premise that has 
been implicit in most of the discussions considered in this paper – that 
causes have their e"ects in virtue of their properties. For this reason it is 
not possible to accuse Davidson of rendering mental properties epiphe-
nomenal; properties do no causal work in anomalous monism so it cannot, 
therefore, be accused of property epiphenomenalism. 
 Jaegwon Kim, Ted Honderich and the like are well entitled to an 
ontological system, or “theory of events” (Gibb, 2006: 415) that entails 
properties, and, indeed, they have advanced such systems themselves (e.g. 
Kim, 2005). !ey assume that statements, in some sense, correspond with 
the world and that physics is the set of truthful statements about real-
ity – in which case mental statements will be truthful only insofar as they 
are reducible to physical ones. It is #ne for them to hold that position, 
and, indeed, as the argument goes property epiphenomenalism may well 
be a problem for property dualists of the non-reductive physicalist kind, 
but Davidson is not a property dualist. It is not #ne, however, to criti-
cise anomalous monism because, when placed in this ontological system, 
it results in property epiphenomenalism, since this is not what David-
son argues – he clearly states his own ontological system that is distinct 
from the former and from which anomalous monism emerges. As Gibb 
observes, property epiphenomenalism would be a plausible criticism of 
‘anomalous monism if embedded within a Kimean theory of events, but 
to criticise Davidson’s theory under a scheme of events that is not his own 
would be question-begging’ (Gibb, 2006: 414-415). As such Davidson 
and anomalous monism have been erroneously accused of property epi-
phenomenalism.
 Accepting that anomalous monism works with a di"erent ontology 
means that criticisms of the argument must either be made from within 
that ontology, or of that ontology itself. Sophie Gibb sets out to attack 
Davidson’s approach to ontology, arguing, instead, that that is really the 
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problem with anomalous monism. Her arguments are the focus of the next 
section.
8. On Davidson’s Ontology
Sophie Gibb suggests that we should reject anomalous monism not 
because it implies property epiphenomenalism (which, she acknowledges, 
it doesn’t) but because of ‘the implausibility of the ontological system 
within which it is based’ (Gibb, 2006: 408). Against Davidson she levels 
three critiques: that NCC is unsupported, that his nominalism implies 
the acceptance of disjunctive regularities as strict law statements, and that 
Davidson does ontology the “wrong way round”. !is section deals with 
each of these claims in turn.
8.1 !e Nomological Character of Causality is Unsupported
Gibb argues that Davidson does not support his assumption of the Nomo-
logical Character of Causality (NCC), which Davidson himself admits. 
Now, those who accept some kind of correspondence theory of truth, so 
that strict law statements could correspond to actually existent laws relating 
cause and e"ect, might #nd an ontological justi#cation for NCC, but such 
a defence is not open to Davidson; who, as we noted above, rejects such 
correspondence. Indeed the acceptance of NCC really is di%cult to recon-
cile with Davidson’s nominalism, but this is a separate line of argument to 
the claim that his ontology is implausible. Even if it should prove to be the 
case that the committed Davidsonian cannot maintain NCC, then, of the 
many other undesirable consequences that could result from this, I do not 
think the abandonment of the more general stance of anomalous monism 
is one of them – indeed, we should probably have to abandon physical 
causal closure, but we need not abandon the claim that the mental inter-
acts causally with the physical, or that there are no strict psychophysical 
laws. It may be decided that compromising our belief in physical causal 
closure is too heavy a price to pay in order to accept anomalous monism, 
in which case let’s out with it, but it still remains to be demonstrated that a 
Davidsonian position actually cannot maintain NCC. Failing to motivate 
the assumption is a criticism, no doubt, but it only spells serious trouble 
for anomalous monism, I believe, if it proves to be inconsistent with the 
nominalism that underpins the theory, and this Gibb does not show.
8.2 Accepting Disjunctive Regularities as Strict Law Statements
Gibb’s second argument is that a nominalism of the sort that Davidson 
embraces would lead to the acceptance of the existence of objective dis-
junctive regularities. Her discussion starts by asking how the Davidsonian 
is to identify regularities since, ‘without properties, there would seem to be 
nothing that distinguishes those events that are alike from those that are 
not’ (Gibb, 2006: 418). She suggests that a strategy could be to maintain 
that events can be distinguished, and regularities consequently identi#ed, 
by determining the predicates that those events satisfy. !e problem with 
such a position, she suggests, is that it entails that we must accept disjunc-
tive regularities as strict law statements. In this case predicates like “grue” 
could feature in strict law statements, which, she remarks, is problematic 
since ‘the regularities that this predicate yields, or indeed that any such dis-
junctive predicate yields, are surely not real regularities.’ (Gibb, 2006: 419, 
emphasis added) However, I see no reason why the committed Davidso-
nian could not bite the bullet here and accept disjunctive regularities of 
this order as strict law statements: the concern for “realness” only comes 
in if one accepts correspondence. Indeed, Gibb’s concern, as she herself 
admits, only arises if one accepts a “truthmaker principle” (so that law 
statements are made true by regularities in the world, i.e. there are “real” 
regularities which law statements can either correspond or fail to corre-
spond to), Davidson’s rejection of such a truthmaker principle e"ectively 
shields anomalous monism from the real bite of this argument.
8.3 Davidson’s Ontology is “Implausible”
Gibb’s #nal claim is against Davidson’s approach to ontology, asserting 
that ‘even given doubts about the truthmaker principle, from an ontologi-
cal point of view, Davidson has arguably got things the wrong way round.’ 
(Gibb, 2006: 420) She maintains that:
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‘One’s motivation for accepting or rejecting an ontological category, 
and hence a theory of the causal relata, should not have semantic 
considerations at its base, because contrary to Davidson, a theory of 
meaning cannot be appealed to in order to settle ontological issues’ 
(Ibid.: 420).
Gibb suggests that Davidson ought not to rule out the existence of proper-
ties on semantic grounds, and that, instead, metaphysical enquiry should 
be conducted to establish the nature of causation. !is enquiry, she sug-
gests, will #nd that “properties inevitably play an essential role within one’s 
ontological system and more speci#cally within one’s theory of causation,” 
(Ibid.: 420) and, as such, anomalous monism can, and indeed will, be 
rejected because of the implausibility of its ontological system. 
 !is #nal argument of Gibb’s is the closest to being an actual refuta-
tion of anomalous monism –  if she were correct and Davidson’s ontology 
were, indeed, misguided, then the arguments for anomalous monism 
would crumble along with its ontological foundations. However, Gibb 
provides no actual argument as to why Davidson’s ontology is “implausi-
ble” or why his approach is the wrong way round, other than repeating the 
point implicit in the work of reductive and non-reductive physicists alike: 
that events have their e"ects in virtue of their properties. Simply saying 
that ‘a theory of causal relata should not have semantic considerations at 
its base’ will not convince the committed Davidsonian, who could as easily 
reply “Yes, it should.”
 !e di"erence emerges in the approach of the two camps to metaphys-
ics. As Davidson observes:
‘When we study terms and sentences directly, not in the light of a 
comprehensive theory, we must bring metaphysics to language; we 
assign roles to words and sentences in accord with the categories we 
independently posit on epistemological or metaphysical grounds. 
Operating in this way, philosophers ponder such questions as whether 
there must be entities, perhaps universals, that correspond to predicates, 
or non-existent entities to correspond to non-denoting names or 
descriptions’ (Davidson, 1977: 205). 
!is could be said to summarise the key distinction between the kind of 
approach Gibb advocates (which this quote discusses), and which is per-
haps implicit in the property epiphenomenalism debate, and the approach 
to metaphysics defended by Davidson. 
 In contrast to Gibb, Davidson takes a holistic approach to the nature 
of meaning (e.g. Davidson, 1974a). He argues that because we cannot 
independently separate an agent’s beliefs (including our own) from the 
meaning of the propositions to which those beliefs relate, and because the 
meaning of any given proposition depends on the system of beliefs into 
which that proposition is situated, we can only assign meaning to indi-
vidual propositions once we have something like a theory of interpretation 
for the language as a whole. For this theory of interpretation Davidson 
adopts a Tarskian truth-conditional semantics, specifying T-sentences that 
give truth conditions in the theory language for utterances in the language 
to be interpreted. !e idea is that the total set of T-sentences should maxi-
mise agreement between the speaker and the interpreter. In specifying 
these T-sentences, Davidson notes that we can (and must) give T-sentences 
which also provide truth conditions for all names and predicates in the 
language, with the result that we can actually eliminate those semantic 
terms; ‘the call for entities to correspond to predicates disappears when 
the theory is made to produce T-sentences without excess semantic bag-
gage’ (Davidson, 1977: 206). Conversely, Davidson posits the existence of 
events and people because he maintains that quanti#ers must be under-
stood referentially in order to make sense of expressions ‘for large stretches 
of language’ (Ibid.: 210) (for events, in particular, he argues that this is the 
only e"ective way to make sense of adverbial modi#cation (see Davidson, 
1967a)). As such Davidson’s ontology admits events and agents but does 
not include properties. !is is not to say that he denies their existence, but 
that he merely argues that they are super$uous to the understanding of 
ontology, and therefore must also be super$uous to the understanding of 
causal relations.
 Gibb’s disagreement is presumably with this approach to ontology, 
and certainly, it may seem intuitively appealing to posit the existence of 
entities that correspond to properties, and a long tradition of philosophy 
has done so. However, Davidson’s theory has also been very in$uential, 
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and it is insu%cient as a criticism of anomalous monism to simply main-
tain that Davidson’s approach to ontology is “the wrong way round”, 
without providing anything in the way of arguments to make that case. 
A critique of Davidson’s semantic approach to metaphysics that proved to 
be de#nitive would certainly undermine the cogency of his argument for 
anomalous monism, but Gibb provides no such critique and, in the end, 
simply announces her allegiance to the other side.
9. Conclusion
Anomalous monism does not and cannot imply property epiphenomenal-
ism. Physicalists of di"erent stripes are free to battle it out as to whether 
or not they must accept or reject property epiphenomenalism, but they 
ought not to involve Davidson in their debates. Anomalous monism is 
too frequently taken to be a kind of non-reductive physicalism, but in fact 
the classi#cation runs in the other direction: non-reductive physicalism 
is a kind of anomalous monism (in so far as there are no psychophysical 
laws, and it is monistic), but it is a di"erent one to that which David-
son proposes (and, in so far as it accepts property dualism, non-reductive 
physicalism is arguably a kind of dualism). As Gibb notes, ‘it is with good 
reason that Davidson refers to his position within the philosophy of mind 
as a monism rather than a physicalism, because for Davidson, events form 
a neutral class of entities’ (Gibb, 2006: 414). Whilst physicalists believe 
events to be ultimately physical, Davidson makes no such ontological 
claim; his position is a far more neutral monism than is generally asserted.
 !ere is a lesson to be learned from this debate that Gibb well sum-
marises: 
‘What the problem of mental causation is actually a problem about, and 
the possible ways of responding to it, depends upon what causation is 
a relation between; one’s theory of the causal relata provides the very 
framework for one’s theory of mental causation’ (Gibb, 2006: 407). 
In a sense, then, there must be ontological agreement before there can be 
disagreement about the character of mental causation. Davidson’s ontol-
ogy di"ers dramatically from those of the physicalists considered in this 
paper; as such anomalous monism cannot answer to the problems that 
a"ect those systems. More re#ned criticisms must face against the ontol-
ogy directly, or treat anomalous monism on its own terms.
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Notes
1 A position which is implied by NCC in conjunction with AOM.
2 As, Honderich suggests, is implied by NCC.
3 !ese notions of realisation and identity are associated with the supervenience thesis, 
originally entailed in anomalous monism, speci#cally that the mental supervenes on the 
physical.
4 “Exempli#cations of mental properties of mental events are identical with exempli#cations 
of physical properties of physical events” (Macdonald and Macdonald, 1991: 562).
5 Overdetermination, simply put, is where a given event is caused by two or more 
independent causes that would each, by themselves, be su%cient to bring about the event. 
Consider, for example, a (non-waterproof ) watch that is simultaneously immersed in 
water and crushed in a vice. Both the immersion in water and the crushing of the watch 
would be su%cient for the watch to seize functioning. !e event of the watch ceasing to 
function is therefore said to be overdetermined. It does seem counter-intuitive to suppose 
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that overdetermination plays such a continuous role in our experience as to be occurring 
whenever the mental interacts causally with the physical, and, indeed, Kim calls such a 
position “absurd” (Kim, 1989b: 44).
6 Because the identity argument maintains that mental causation is physical causation, the 
two causes are not independent but are the same, therefore there is no overdetermination.
7 Consider the watch example above as a “genuine” case.
8 It may be worth distinguishing here between causal exclusion and explanatory exclusion. 
Whilst causal exclusion is an ontological thesis, claiming that no one event can have two 
independent causes, explanatory exclusion is more of an epistemological thesis, saying that 
no one event can have two independent explanations. In e"ect the former argues that a 
mental event and a physical event cannot both cause a single physical event, whilst the 
latter argues that the same event cannot be given both a mental and physical explanation. 
To make the case highlighted here Kim only uses causal exclusion.
9 !e formulation of supervenience is a particular thorny issue in the context of this debate, 
but for the purposes of this paper nothing hangs on the nature of supervenience, therefore 
this de#nition will su%ce.
10 Which is Kim’s understanding of Davidson’s intention in "inking Causes.
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